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ABSTRACT
The discovery of adversarial examples has raised concerns about
the practical deployment of deep learning systems. In this paper,
we demonstrate that adversarial examples are capable of manip-
ulating deep learning systems across three clinical domains. For
each of our representative medical deep learning classifiers, both
white and black box attacks were highly successful. Our models are
representative of the current state of the art in medical computer
vision and, in some cases, directly reflect architectures already see-
ing deployment in real world clinical settings. In addition to the
technical contribution of our paper, we synthesize a large body
of knowledge about the healthcare system to argue that medicine
may be uniquely susceptible to adversarial attacks, both in terms
of monetary incentives and technical vulnerability. To this end, we
outline the healthcare economy and the incentives it creates for
fraud and provide concrete examples of how and why such attacks
could be realistically carried out. We urge practitioners to be aware
of current vulnerabilities when deploying deep learning systems in
clinical settings, and encourage the machine learning community
to further investigate the domain-specific characteristics of medical
learning systems.
CCS CONCEPTS
• Computing methodologies → Neural networks; • Applied
computing→Health informatics; • Security and privacy→
Economics of security and privacy.
KEYWORDS
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1 INTRODUCTION
Over the past seven years, deep learning has transformed computer
vision and has been implemented in scores of consumer-facing
products. Many are excited that these approaches will continue to
expand in scope and that new tools and products will be improved
through the use of deep learning. One particularly exciting applica-
tion area of deep learning has been in clinical medicine. There are
,
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many recent high-profile examples of deep learning achieving par-
ity with human physicians on tasks in radiology [21, 56], pathology
[9], dermatology [19], and opthalmology [25]. In some instances,
the performance of these algorithms exceed the capabilities of most
individual physicians in head-to-head comparisons. This has lead
some to speculate that entire specialties in medical imaging, such as
radiology and pathology, may be radically reshaped [27] or cease to
exist entirely. Furthermore, on April 11, 2018, an important step was
taken towards this future: the U.S. Food and Drug Administration
announced the approval of the first computer vision algorithm that
can be utilized for medical diagnosis without the input of a human
clinician [3].
In parallel to this progress inmedical deep learning, the discovery
of so-called ‘adversarial examples’ has exposed vulnerabilities in
even state-of-the-art learning systems [22]. Adversarial examples –
inputs engineered to cause misclassification – have quickly become
one of the most popular areas of research in the machine learning
community [41, 42, 49, 61]. While much of the interest with adver-
sarial examples has stemmed from their ability to shed light on
possible limitations of current deep learning methods, adversarial
examples have also received attention because of the cybersecu-
rity threats they may pose for deploying these algorithms in both
virtual and physical settings [7, 12, 24, 32, 39, 49].
Given the enormous costs of healthcare in the US, it may seem
prudent to take the expensive human ‘out of the loop’ and replace
him or her with an extremely cheap and highly accurate deep learn-
ing algorithm. This seems especially tempting given a recent study’s
finding that physician and nursing pay is one of the key drivers
of high costs in the US relative to other developed countries [46].
However, there is an under-appreciated downside to widespread
automation of medical imaging tasks given the current vulnerabili-
ties of these algorithms. If we seriously consider taking the human
doctor completely ‘out of the loop’ (which now has legal sanction in
at least one setting via the FDA, with many more to likely follow),
we are forced to also consider how adversarial attacks may present
new opportunities for fraud and harm. In fact, even with a human
in the loop, any clinical system that leverages a machine learning
algorithm for diagnosis, decision-making, or reimbursement could
be manipulated with adversarial examples.
In this paper, we extend previous results on adversarial examples
to three medical deep learning systems modeled after the state of
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the art medical classifiers. On the basis of these results and knowl-
edge of the healthcare system, we argue that medical imaging is
particularly vulnerable to adversarial attacks and that there are po-
tentially enormous incentives to motivate prospective bad actors to
carry out these attacks. We hope that by highlighting these vulner-
abilities, more researchers will explore potential defenses against
these attacks within the healthcare domain. Because the health-
care system is complex and administrative processes can appear
byzantine, it may be difficult to imagine how these attacks could
be operationalized. To ground these abstract potentials for harm
in actual use cases, we describe realistic scenarios where clinical
tasks might rely on deep learning and give specific examples of the
fraud that could be mediated by adversarial attacks. Our goal is to
provide background on the distinct features of the medical pipeline
that make adversarial attacks a threat, and also to demonstrate the
practical feasibility of these attacks on real medical deep learning
systems.
1.1 Adversarial Examples
Adversarial examples are inputs to machine learning models that
have been crafted to force the model to make a classification error.
This problem extends back in time at least as far as the spam filter,
where systematic modifications to email such as ‘good word attacks’
or spelling modifications have long been employed to try to bypass
the filters [16, 34, 35]. More recently, adversarial examples were
re-discovered and described in the context of deep computer vision
systems through the work of Szegedy et al. [61] and Goodfellow
et al. [22]. Particularly intriguing in these early examples was the
fact that adversarial examples could be crafted to be extremely
effective despite being imperceptibly different from natural images
to human eyes. In the years since, adversarial examples – visible
and otherwise – have been shown to exist for a wide variety of
classic and modern learning systems [12, 18, 48]. By the same token,
adversarial examples have been extended to various other domains
such as text and speech processing [14, 28]. For an interesting
history of adversarial examples and methods used to combat them
see Biggio and Roli [10].
Figure 1 places adversarial attacks within the broader context of
machine learning development and deployment. While there are
many possible intentional and inadvertent failures of real-world ma-
chine learning systems, adversarial attacks are particularly impor-
tant to consider from the standpoint of model deployment, because
they enable those submitting data into a running ML algorithm to
subtly influence its behavior without ever achieving direct access
to the model itself or the IT infrastructure that hosts it.
Adversarial examples are generally thought to arise from the
piecewise linear components of complex nonlinear models [22].
They are not random, they are not due to overfitting or incomplete
model training, they occupy only a comparatively small subspace
of the feature landscape, they are robust to random noise, and
they have been shown to transfer in many cases from one model
to another [48, 62]. Furthermore, in addition to executing many
successful attacks in purely virtual settings, researchers in the past
several years have also demonstrated that adversarial attacks can
generalize to physical world settings [7, 12, 20, 32].
One natural question raised by the existence of adversarial exam-
ples is to what extent and in what forms they constitute a viable risk
for harm in real-world machine learning settings. Many authors
have discussed the feasibility of and possible motivations for ad-
versarial attacks on certain real-world systems such as self-driving
cars [15, 20, 36]. However, to our knowledge, previous machine
learning literature has yet to thoroughly discuss the possibility of
adversarial attacks on medical systems.
2 IDENTIFYING FACTORS IN THE U.S.
HEALTHCARE SYSTEM THAT FAVOR
ADVERSARIAL ATTACKS
In this section, we provide a synthesis of aspects of the healthcare
system that may create both the incentive and the opportunity for
a bad actor to carry out an adversarial attack.
2.1 Background on the healthcare economy
and possible incentives for fraud via
adversarial attacks
The healthcare economy is huge and fraud is already perva-
sive. The United States spent approximately $3.3 trillion (17.8%
of GDP) on healthcare in 2016 [46], and healthcare is projected to
represent 1/5 of the US economy by 2025. Given the vast sums of
money represented by the healthcare economy, inevitably some
seek to profit by committing fraud against the healthcare system.
Medical fraud is estimated to cost hundreds of billions of dollars
each year, and one study estimated this number to be as high as
$272 billion in 2011 [26]. Fraud is committed both by large institu-
tions and by individual actors. Large institutions engage in fraud by
systemically inflating costs for services to increase revenue [51, 58].
Likewise, it has been found that some individual physicians rou-
tinely bill for the highest allowable amount over 90% of the time
[45].
Algorithmswill likelymakemedical reimbursement deci-
sions in the future.Due to the amount ofmoney involvedwith the
delivery of healthcare, complex book-keeping systems have been
created to facilitate billing and reimbursement. In fact, most of the
data generated by the healthcare system in the electronic healthcare
record (EHR) is created to justify payments from ‘payers’ (private or
public insurers) to ’providers’ (hospitals and physicians). In many
cases, the level of monetary reimbursement for a given patient
hinges on the establishment of specific diagnostic ‘codes’, which
are used to record a patient’s diagnoses and treatments with high
granularity 1[59]. In an effort to increase revenue, some providers
engage in the practice of ’upcoding’ diagnoses or procedures –
selecting the codes which will allow them to bill for the highest
amount. For their part, insurance companies seek to minimize total
expenditure by investing millions of dollars in IT and personnel to
identify unjustified billing codes. The resultant struggle between
payors and providers has been extensively documented [30, 65].
To ensure consistency and justifiability, insurance companies will
often demand specific gold standard tests as proof of diagnosis be-
fore reimbursing a given medical claim, and leverage increasingly
1See for instance the International Classification of Disease code V97.33XD, which
represents the following diagnosis: ‘Sucked into jet engine, subsequent encounter’
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Figure 1: Adversarial attacks within the broader taxonomy of risks facing the machine learning pipeline. Adversarial attacks
pose just one of many possible risks in the development and deployment of ML systems, but are noteworthy because they
enable end-users to manipulate model outputs without ever influencing the training process or gaining access to the deployed
model itself.
sophisticated analytics to determine reimbursement value. Given
these dynamics, it is seemingly inevitable that insurance companies
will begin to require algorithmic confirmation of certain diagnoses
before providing reimbursement. If and when this occurs, the abil-
ity to undetectably influence (either as a provider or as a payer)
the outputs of trusted and otherwise unbiased diagnostic systems
would result in the ability to influence the movement of billions of
dollars through the healthcare economy. Even today, the practice of
upcoding, which often entails finding subtle combinations of codes
that influence reimbursement [57], can itself be arguably considered
a form of adversarial attack against reimbursement algorithms.
Algorithms will increasingly determine pharmaceutical
and device approvals. The monetary value of a successful clini-
cal trial is immense, with one recent study estimating the median
revenue across individual cancer drugs to be as high as $1.67 billion
only four years after approval [53]. At the same time, regulatory
bodies such as the FDA are increasingly allowing for the approval
of new drugs based on digital surrogates for patient response, in-
cluding medical imaging [52]. As algorithmic endpoints for clinical
trials become increasingly accepted – and deep learning algorithms
continue to assert themselves as equal or superior to humans on
well-defined visual diagnostic tasks – we could soon reach a future
where billion dollar drug decisions are made primarily by machines.
In such a future, effectively executed adversarial attacks could al-
low trialists to imperceptibly ‘put their thumb on the scale,’ even
if images are vetted to ensure they are coming from the correct
patients.
2.2 Distinctive technical sources of
vulnerability to adversarial attacks among
medical machine learning systems
Ground truth is often ambiguous. Compared to most common
image classification tasks, the ground truth in medical imaging is
often controversial, with even specialty radiologists disagreeing
on well defined tasks [11, 33, 43]. As such, if end-users selectively
perturb images for which it is difficult to establish the true diag-
nosis, they can make it extremely difficult to detect their influence
through even expert human review. Somewhat ironically, it is these
borderline cases are where deep learning is likely to be most valu-
able.
Medical imaging is highly standardized. Compared to other
domains of computer vision, medical imaging is extremely stan-
dardized, with images generally captured with pre-defined and
well-establisehd positioning and exposure [60]. As such, medical
adversarial attacks do not need to meet the same standards of in-
variance to lighting and positional changes as attacks on other
real-world systems such as self-driving cars. This is potentially
,
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important, as some have argued that dynamic viewing conditions
imply that ‘there is a good prospect that adversarial examples can
be reduced to a curiosity with little practical impact’ [36].
Commodity network architectures are often used. Nearly
all of the most successful published methods in medical computer
vision have consisted of the same fundamental architecture: one of
a small set of pretained ImageNet models that was fine-tuned to the
specific task [19, 25, 64]. This lack of architectural diversity could
make it easier for potential attackers to build transferable attacks
against medical systems. By the same token, given the importance
of peer review and publication in validating and approving medical
diagnostics, it is likely the architectures of most medical image
classification models will be public for the sake of transparency,
allowing for more targeted adversarial attacks.
Medical data interchange is limited and balkanized. Five
electronic health record (EHR) vendors constitute about half of the
market and hundreds of others serve the other half. Even within an
EHR vendor, data sharing is spotty and the terminologies and their
semantics vary considerably from one implementation to another.
On the one hand, this means that there are no universally shared
mechanisms for authentication, verification of message integrity,
data quality metrics, nor mechanisms for automated oversight. On
the other hand, this allows healthcare providers to customize their
EHR’s, billing, and other information technology systems in ways
that are opaque to most external auditors using one-size-fits-all
tools and methods.
Hospital infrastructure is very hard to update.Medical soft-
ware is often implemented within monolithic enterprise-wide pro-
prietery software systems, making updates, revisions and fixes
expensive and time-consuming. For context, consider the coding
dictionaries used to classify patients’ diseases, the International
Classification of Disease (ICD) system. As recently as 2013, most
hospitals were operating using the ninth edition of this coding
scheme, published in 1978, despite the fact that a revised version
(ICD-10) was published in 1990. All told, the conversion to the
ICD-10 coding scheme has been estimated to cost major health cen-
ters up to $20 million each and require up to 15 years [59]. Others
decided in the early 2000s that it would be preferable to skip the
1990 schema entirely and wait for ICD-11, despite the fact that its
release wasn’t scheduled until 2018. Thus, vulnerabilities present in
medical software are likely to persist for years due to the difficulty
and expense involved with update hospital infrastructure.
Medicine contains a mix of technical and non-technical
workers. Compared to many other industries, medicine is ex-
tremely interdisciplinary and mostly comprised of members who
lack a strong computational or statistical training background. For
example, in the case of self-driving cars, the teams developing com-
puter vision systems are likely to be led and staffed primarily by
engineers, if not computer scientists. In contrast, since the clinical
usability of medical imaging systems is also extremely important,
hospitals are likely to lean heavily on physician-researchers in de-
veloping these systems, who tend to lack robust computational
expertise [38].
Biomedical images carry personal signatures that could
be used to defend againstmany simpler attacks, but not against
adversarial examples. One potential alternative to adversarial at-
tacks on part of malicious end-users would be to simply substitute
in true images of the target class. However, biomedical images –
including retinal images, X-rays, and skin photographs – are often
as unique to their owners as fingerprints [4, 40, 54]. This provides
several advantages against substitution attacks: First, algorithms
could be designed to check input images against prior images from
the same patient, to ensure that their identities match. Second, al-
gorithms could query against the database of previously submitted
images and flag any inputs that are likely from the same patients
as previous entries. Both strategies would make it more difficult
for fraudsters to continually execute substitution attacks against
ML systems, but neither would defend against adversarial attacks,
which needn’t change the personal identifiers in the image. By
analogy, adversarial attacks applied to billing codes or medical text
could serve to manipulate reimbursement algorithms by selecting
combinations of codes or words that are individually truthful but
in combination yield anomalously high reimbursement.
There are many potential adversaries. The medical imaging
pipeline has many potential attackers and is thus vulnerable at
many different stages. While in theory one could devise elaborate
image verification schemes throughout the data processing pipeline
to try to guard against attacks, this would be extremely costly and
difficult to implement in practice.
3 ATTACKING REPRESENTATIVE CLINICAL
DEEP LEARNING SYSTEMS
To demonstrate the feasibility of medical adversarial attacks, we
developed a series of medical classifiers modeled after state-of-the-
art clinical deep learning systems, and launched successful white-
and black-box attacks against each.
3.1 Methods
3.1.1 Construction of medical classification models. We developed
baseline models to classify referable diabetic retinopathy from reti-
nal fundoscopy (similar to Gulshan et al. [25]), pneumothorax from
chest-xray (similar to Wang et al. [64] and Rajpurkar et al. [56]),
and melanoma from dermoscopic photographs (similar to Esteva
et al. [19]). The decision to build models for these particular tasks
was made both due to public data availability, as well as the fact
that they represent three of the most highly visible successes for
medical deep learning.
All of our models were trained on publicly available data. For dia-
betic retinopathy, this was the Kaggle Diabetic Retinopathy dataset
[2]. The key distinction with the Kaggle dataset, however, was that
we were seeking to predict referable (grade 2 or worse) diabetic
retinopathy in accordance with Gulshan et al. [25] rather than pre-
dicting the retinopathy grade itself as was the case in the Kaggle
competition. As such, the training and test sets from the kaggle
competition were merged, relabeled using their provided grades,
and split by patient into training and test sets with probability
0.88/0.12. For the chest x-rays, we used the ChestX-Ray14 dataset
described by Wang et al. [64]. We identified cases and controls by
selecting images whose labeled contained ‘pneumothorax’ or ‘no
finding’, respectively, and additionally excluded from our control
group any images from patients who had received both labels. We
then split by patient into training and test sets with probability
0.85/0.15. For melanoma, we downloaded images labeled as benign
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or malignant melanocytic lesions from the International Skin Imag-
ing Collaboration website [1], splitting again into training and test
sets with probability 0.85/0.15.
As in the case of all three of the original papers that inspired
these models, we built our classifiers by fine-tuning a pretrained
ImageNet model. For convenience and consistency, we chose to
build each of our networks using a pretrained ResNet-50 model,
fine-tuned in Keras using stochastic gradient descent with a learn-
ing rate of 1E-3 and Momentum of 0.9. Data was augmented using
45◦ rotation and horizontal flipping chest x-ray images, and with
360◦ rotation, vertical and horizontal flipping, and mixup [66] for
fundoscopy and dermoscopy images. In all three cases, these set-
tings provided respectable performance and we therefore didn’t
perform dedicated hyperparameter optimization.
3.1.2 Construction of adversarial attacks. To demonstrate the vul-
nerability of our models to adversarial attacks under a variety of
threat models, we implemented both human-imperceptible and
patch attacks.
For our human-imperceptible attacks, we followed the white
and black box PGD attack strategies published in Madry et al. [37],
which were also described as baselines in Kannan et al. [29]. The
PGD attack (see Madry et al. [37] and also Kurakin et al. [32]) is
an iterative extension of the canonical fast gradient sign method
(FGSM) attack developed by Goodfellow et al. [22]. In the PGD
attack, given input x ∈ Rd , loss function L(θ ,x ,y), and a set of
allowed perturbations S ⊆ Rd (most commonly the ℓ∞ ball around
x), one can perform a projected gradient descent on the negative
loss function:
xt+1 = Πx+S(xt + ϵsgn(∇xL(θ ,x ,y)))
in order to identify an optimal perturbation. We implemented the
PGD attack using the library Cleverhans, conducting 20 iterations
with hyperparameter ϵ = 0.02 (ϵ corresponds to the maximum
permitted ℓ∞ norm of the perturbation) [47].
For our adversarial patch attacks, we followed the approach of
Brown et al. [12]. The learning process of the adversarial patch pˆ
uses a variant of the expectation over transformation algorithm
(originally proposed by Athalye et al. [6]), which can be expressed
as the following maximization:
pˆ = argmax
p
E
[
logpY |X (yˆ |A (p,X ,L,T ))
]
(1)
where pY |X (·|·) represents the probability output from the clas-
sifier given the input image X , L is the location of the patch, T
is the transformation (rotation and scaling), yˆ is the target label
(for our application binary label), and A(·, ·, ·, ·) is the deterministic
mapping of given image, patch, location and transformation into
the adversarially patched input image. The expectation is over the
locations, transformations and input images, thus allowing the re-
sulting patch to be ‘universal,’ because it was trained over the entire
training set and robust since training averaged over various loca-
tion and transformations. We deployed adversarial patches with
scaling parameter 0.4.
White box attacks for each attack were implemented by building
attacks directly on the victim model itself. As in Madry et al. [37]
and Kannan et al. [29], black box attacks were performed by craft-
ing the attack against an independently-trained model with the
same architecture and then transferring the resultant adversarial
examples to the victim.
Finally, as a control, we implemented a naive patch attack using
natural images, as in Brown et al. [12]. To make this as strong a
baseline as reasonably possible, we built our natural image patches
using the images assigned by the model with the highest probability
of the target class. Resultant patches were then applied to the test
set images with random rotation and scaling factor 0.4, so match
the adversarial patch.
Availability of code: Code to reproduce the analyses and re-
sults can be found at the first author’s Github account:
https://github.com/sgfin/adversarial-medicine.
3.2 Results
The results of our experiments are depicted in Table 1 and in Fig-
ure 2.
While discrepancies in data source and train-test partitioning
makes direct comparison to state-of-the-art models unfeasible, all
of our baseline models achieved performance reasonably consistent
with the results reported in the original manuscripts on natural im-
ages: AUROC of 0.910 for diabetic retinopathy compared with 0.936
reported in Gulshan et al. [25], AUROC of 0.936 for pneumothorax
compared with 0.90 reported by Rajpurkar et al. [56], and AUROC
of 0.86 on melanoma compared with 0.91-0.94 reported in Esteva
et al. [19].
Projected gradient descent attacks, targeting the incorrect an-
swer in every case, produced effective AUROCs of 0.000 and accu-
racies of 0% for all white box attacks. Black box attacks produced
AUROCs of less than 0.10 for all tasks, and accuracies ranging from
0.01% on fundoscopy to 37.9% on dermoscopy. Qualitatively, all
attacks were human-imperceptible.
Adversarial patch attacks also achieved effective AUROCs of
0.000 and accuracies of <1% for white box attacks on all tasks. Black
box adversarial patch attacks achieved AUROCs of less than 0.005
for all tasks and accurracies less than 10%. The "natural patch"
controls created by adding patches created from the most-strongly
classified image of the desired class resulted in AUROCs ranging
from 0.48-0.83 with accuracies ranging from 67.5% to 92.1%.
4 DISCUSSION
Our experiments indicate that adversarial attacks are likely to be
feasible even for extremely accurate medical classifiers, regardless
of whether prospective attackers have direct access to the model
or require their attacks to be human imperceptible. Of note, while
the PGD attacks require digital access to the specific images to be
sent into the model, adversarial patch attacks are universal in the
sense that they can be applied to any image. This could open the
possibility for implementation of attacks upstream from the image
capture itself, rendering data processing defenses such as image
hashing at point-of-capture ineffective. In addition, it is noteworthy
to recognize that adversarial patches were far more potent than
"photoshop"-style natural patch attacks that alter the image using
the most strongly classified image from the training set.
,
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Fundoscopy Chest X-Ray Dermoscopy
Input Images Accuracy AUROC Avg. Conf. Accuracy AUROC Avg. Conf. Accuracy AUROC Avg. Conf.
Clean 91.0% 0.910 90.4% 94.9% 0.937 96.1% 87.6% 0.858 94.1%
PGD - White Box 0.00% 0.000 100.0% 0.00% 0.000 100.0% 0.00% 0.000 100.0%
PGD - Black Box 0.01% 0.002 90.9% 15.1% 0.014 92.6% 37.9% 0.071 92.0%
Patch - Natural 78.5% 0.828 80.8% 92.1% 0.539 95.8% 67.5% 0.482 85.6%
Patch - White Box 0.3% 0.000 99.2% 0.00% 0.000 98.8% 0.00% 0.000 99.7%
Patch - Black Box 3.9% 0.000 97.5% 9.7% 0.004 83.3% 1.37% 0.000 97.6%
Table 1: Results of medical deep learning models on clean test set data, white box, and black box attacks.
Figure 2: Characteristic results of adversarialmanipulation. Each clean image represents the natural image towhich themodel
assigns the highest probability for the given diagnosis. The percentage displayed on the bottom left of each image represents
the probability that the model assigns that image of being diseased. Green = Model is correct on that image. Red = Model is
incorrect.
We now discuss how someone might perform adversarial at-
tacks against the systems developed in previous section under a
realistic set of conditions. As stated above, we focus this discussion
on imaging-based ML models, though similar arguments apply to
adversarial examples crafted on billing code submissions or medical
text. For the purposes of illustration, consider a scenario where the
ML models have been subjected to extensive testing and validation
and are now clinically deployed. These systems would function
much like laboratory tests do now and provide confirmation of sus-
pected diagnoses. In some instances, an insurance company may
require a confirmatory diagnosis from one of these systems in order
for a reimbursement to be made. Further, the insurance company or
Adversarial Attacks Against Medical Deep Learning Systems
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regulatory agency may have separate methods deployed to ensure
the patient identity matches from prior images or has never been
submitted from the same provider before. We provide the examples
below to show that in many instances there is both the opportunity
and incentive for someone to use an adversarial example to defraud
the healthcare system.
4.1 Hypothetical examples
Adversarial examples in dermatology: Dermatology in the US
operates under a ‘fee for service’ model wherein a physician or
practice is paid for the services or procedures they perform for
the patient. Under this model, dermatologists are incentivized to
perform as many procedures as possible, as their revenue is directly
tied to the amount of procedures they perform. This has caused
some dermatologists to perform a huge number of unnecessary
procedures to increase revenue. For example, one dermatologist in
Florida was recently sentenced to 22 years in prison after perform-
ing more than three thousand unnecessary surgical procedures
[58]. To combat fraud and unnecessary procedures such as this, an
insurance company could require that a deep learning system (e.g.
the one from Section 4) analyzes all dermoscopy images to confirm
that surgery is necessary. In this scenario, a bad actor could add
adversarial noise to images to ensure that the deep learning model
always gives the diagnosis that he or she desires. Furthermore, they
could add this noise to ‘borderline’ cases, which would render the
attack nearly impossible to detect by human review. Thus, a bad
actor like the Florida dermatologist from [58] could sidestep an
insurance company’s image-based fraud detector and continue to
defraud the system in perpetuity.
Adversarial examples in radiology. Thoracic radiology im-
ages (typically CT scans, which is a 3D application of X-Ray tech-
nology) are also often used to measure tumor burden, a common
secondary endpoint of cancer therapy response[52]. To foster more
rapid and more universally standardized clinical trials, the FDA
might consider requiring that trial endpoints, such as tumor burden
in chest imaging, be evaluated by a deep learning system such as
the one from Section 4. By applying undetectable adversarial pertur-
bations to the images, a company running a trial could effectively
guarantee a positive trial result with respect to this endpoint, even
if images are subsequently released to the public for inspection. In
addition, chest X-rays provide a common screening test for dozens
of diseases, and a positive chest X-ray result is often used to justify
more heavily reimbursed procedures such as biopsies, CT or MR
imaging, or surgical resection. As such, one could imagine many
scenarios arising around chest X-rays that are directly analogous
to the melanoma detection situation described above.
Adversarial examples in ophthalmology. As described in
Section 3, providers and pharmaceutical companies are not the
only organizations that could be incentivized to employ adversarial
manipulation. Often, the entities who pay for healthcare (such as
private or public insurers) wish to curtail the utilization rates of cer-
tain procedures to reduce costs. However, there are often guidelines
from government agencies (such as the Centers for Medicare and
Medicaid Services) that specify diagnostic criteria which if present
dictate that certain procedures must be covered. One such criterion
could be that any patient with a confirmed diabetic retinopathy
diagnosis from a deep learning system such as the one from Sec-
tion 4 must have the resulting vitrectomy surgery covered by their
insurer. Even though the insurer has no ability to control the policy,
they could still control the rate of surgeries by applying adversarial
noise to mildly positive images, reducing the number of procedures.
On the other end of the spectrum, an ophthalmologist could affix a
universal adversarial patch to the lens of his image capture system,
forcing a third party image processing system to mistake all images
for positive cases without having to make an alterations to the
image within the IT system itself.
4.2 Possible areas for further research
We hope that our discussion and demonstrations can help motivate
further research into adversarial examples generally as well as
within the specific context of healthcare. In particular, we consider
the following areas to be of high priority:
Algorithmic defenses against adversarial examples remain an
extremely open and challenging problem. We defer a full discussion
of the extremely rapidly evolving field of adversarial defenses to the
primary literature [13, 17, 22, 29, 31, 31, 37, 48, 49, 55, 61, 62]. Un-
fortunately, despite the explosive emergence of defense strategies,
there does not appear to be a simple and general algorithmic fix
for the adversarial problem available in the short term. For exam-
ple, one recent analysis investigated a series of promising methods
that relied on gradient obfuscation, and demonstrated that they
could be quickly broken [5]. Despite this, we also note that princi-
pled approaches to adversarial robustness are beginning to show
promise. For example, several papers have demonstrated what ap-
pears to be both high accuracy and strong adversarial robustness
on smaller datasets such as MNIST, [29, 37], and there have also
been several results including theoretical guarantees of adversarial
robustness, albeit on small datasets and/or with still-insufficient
accuracy [31]. Generalized attempts at algorithmic robustness are
promising, but have yet to provide methods that can demonstrate
high levels of both accuracy and adversarial robustness at ImageNet
scale. However, domain-specific algorithmic defenses such as
dataset-specific image preprocessing have been shown to be highly
effective on some datasets [23]. In this light, particularly given the
highly standardized image capture procedures in biomedical imag-
ing, we feel that medical-domain-specific algorithmic defenses offer
an important and promising area of future research.
Infrastructural defenses against clinical adversarial attacks
include methods deployed to prevent potential bad actors from al-
tering medical images – or at least make it easier to confirm image
tampering if adversarial examples are suspected. For example, imag-
ing devices could immediately store a hashed version of any image
they generate, which could subsequently be used as a reference.
Likewise, raw clinical images could be processed and analyzed on a
third-party system to prevent any possible systemic manipulation
by payers or providers. This family of approaches to standardized
best practices is reminiscent of the system of Clinical Laboratory
Improvement Amendments (CLIA), a set of federal policies that
regulates the process by which clinical laboratory samples are han-
dled and analyzed in the United States [44]. Given that algorithmic
defenses against adversarial attacks are still very much an area of
research, we feel that infrastructural defenses should be strongly
,
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considered for all medical classifier systems that could carry incen-
tives for adversarial attacks. However, implementing healthcare
system-wide standardization to this end represents and immense
challenge that will require buy-in from both the medical and CS
communities.
Ethical tradeoffs are introduced by adversarial examples. As
outlined above, several papers have demonstrated greater improve-
ments in adversarial robustness that come at a cost of lower ac-
curacy [50, 63]. However, in medical imaging, this introduces an
ethical conundrum: how does one weigh protecting against ad-
versarial examples against any inaccurate diagnosis? Quantifying
and making this trade-off explicit would allow for more informed
decision making and system design.
5 CONCLUSION
The prospect of improving healthcare and medicine with the use
of deep learning is truly exciting. There is reasonable cause for op-
timism that these technologies can improve outcomes and reduce
costs, if judiciously implemented [8]. In this light, it is unsurprising
that dozens of private companies and large health centers have ini-
tiated efforts to deploy deep learning classifiers in clinical practice
settings. As such efforts continue to develop, it seems inevitable
that medical deep learning algorithms will become entrenched in
the already multi-billion dollar medical information technology
industry. However, the massive scale of the healthcare economy
brings with it significant opportunity and incentive for fraudulent
behavior and ultimately, patient harm.
In this work, we have outlined the systemic and technological
reasons that cause adversarial examples to pose a disproportion-
ately large threat in the medical domain, and provided examples of
how such attacks may be executed. We hope that our results help
facilitate a discussion on the threat of adversarial examples among
both computer scientists and medical professionals. For machine
learning researchers, we recommend research into infrastructural
and algorithmic solutions designed to guarantee that attacks are
infeasible or at least can be retroactively identified. For medical
providers, payers, and policy makers, we hope that these practical
examples can motivate a meaningful discussion into how precisely
these algorithms should be incorporated into the clinical ecosystem
despite their current vulnerability to such attacks.
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